Andre Gunder Frank
personal/professional web-page:


www.rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank Andre Gunder Frank
24.02.1929 - 23.04.2005

Obituary by Barry K. Gills

Development

The Underdevelopment of Development / Part 4

by Andre Gunder Frank

 

From National or Capitalist/Socialist Development to One World Development...

 Before I hazard my own answers if any, perhaps I would do well to return to Higgins' review of his and others' answers. To begin with, Higgins distinguishes between positivist "is" and  normative "ought" definitions of development. I now lean to the former. I am prepared to (con)cede to them. Therefore, I will present my thesis that there is only "world development." It is the "evolutionary" (to use Higgins terminology)  positivist (that is negative) constraint on the normative development there "ought" to be. Thus, my one world development conception can perhaps be subsumed under two of Higgins' classifications of development views: No goals of society but only of particular groups or classes, and especially the long process of development with periods of stagnation interrupted by rapid change (Higgins 1990:3-4).

 In that case, I can heartily agree to Higgins' definition of development in "simplest terms as a process of economic, social, and technological  change by which human welfare is improved. Thus development is 'good' by definition."

 Anything that raises the level of human welfare contributes to development; anything that reduces welfare is anti-development, a subtraction from development. Thus, damage to the environment, exhaustion of non-renewable resources, deterioration of the quality of life, destructions of traditional cultural values, increasing inequalities, or loss of freedom which may appear as side effects of certain strategies to promote development reduce the amount of development that is actually achieved. By definition -- my definition -- there can be no conflict between efficiency and development. They are one and the same thing, and so are improvements in the level of welfare [and social justice, which Higgins adds below] (Higgins 1991).

 By this definition, development is a process, and not a state or stage. By analogy, socialism would at best also still be a process. So it was for Marx and Lenin. For them socialism was not an already existing happy state, as Stalin re-defined it. Has someone also re-defined development as a process in the same way?  Moreover, to Higgins' economic, social and technological development; we should then add political, cultural, and perhaps spiritual and other dimensions of development. Presumably this would have his agreement, since he suggests about the same in his own discussion of anti-development.  As Higgins argues therefore, the increase in some of these dimensions at the expense of others does not necessarily spell a process of development. Furthermore by this definition, no country, nation state, economy, or people would be developed. The  industrial(ly) "developed" countries of the West would at best be developing, if they are not underdeveloping. The same would then be true for the countries, regions or peoples in the Socialist East and the Third World South. In many of the latter, however, the process (to coin a phrase) of development of underdevelopment is proceeding apace and even accelerating.  Of course, this is also a process, as I always insisted.

 The idea of one world development (as is) received an unexpected helping hand from the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the United Nations on December 7, 1988:

 The existence of any "closed" societies is hardly possible today. That is why we need a radical revision of views on the sum total of the problems of international cooperation as the most essential component of universal security. The world economy is becoming a single organism, outside which no state can develop normally, regardless of the social system it might belong to or the economic level it has reached....

 Further global progress is now possible only through quest for universal consensus in the movement toward a new world order....

 Freedom of choice is a universal principle. It knows no exceptions....So what we need is unity through variety....This new stage demand[s] that international relations be freed from ideology (Gorbachev 1988).

 Though we may wish to regard some of these as high sounding words, we cannot deny or evade the verity and importance of the central thrust of what Gorbachev says. Moreover, it has direct relevance to our present concern with development, if we use this word where he speaks of "progress" and "security."

 However, I would argue that this verity is nothing new. World development, sorry - evolution, has been a fact of life for a long time.  For a while, I thought that it started with the birth of the world capitalist system five centuries ago. However, I now believe in applying the rule of the American historian of China John King Fairbank (1969) to study historical problems by pursuing them backwards. Therefore, I now find the same continuing world system, including its center-periphery structure, hegemony-rivalry competiton, and cyclical ups and downs has been evolving (developing?) for five thousand years at least (Frank 1990a, 1991, Gills and Frank 1990). In this context, the mixtures and variations of different "modes" of production or of social systems are much less important than the constancy and continutiy of the world system and its essential structure (Frank 1990b). Even Gorbachev dismisses the relevance of these variations among suposedly different "systems" to this real world system development.

 In this world system, sectors, regions and peoples temporarily and cyclically assume leading and hegemonic central (core) positions of social and technological "development." They then have to cede their pride of place to new ones who replace them. Usually this happens after a long interregnum of crisis in the system. During this time of crisis, there is intense competition for leadership and hegemony. The central core has moved around the globe in a predominantly westerly direction. With some zig zags, the central core has passed through Asia, East (China), Central (Mongolia), South (India) and West (Iran, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Turkey). (The latter is now called the "Middle East" in eurocentric terminology). Then, the core passed on to Southern and Western Europe and Britain, via the Atlantic to North America, and now across it and the Pacific towards Japan. Who knows, perhaps one day it will pass back all the way around the world to China.

 In the social evolution (to use Higgins terminology) of this world system in recent centuries, of course there has also been a positivist "as is" development of the capitalist and patriarchic system in the world. At the sub-system levels of countries, regions or sectors, all "as is" or even the "ought be" "development" has ocurred through and thanks to their (temporarily) more privileged position in the inter"national" division of labor and power. The recently prevalent positivist "as is" and normative  "ought be" notions of "national development" are the result of a myopic optical illusion. These notions and the illusion are derived from a self-interested selective tunnel vision perception. It lacks an objective global assessment of real world development, either as is or as ought be. The development ideology reviewed here was based on and is now doomed by this self-illusory perception. It is less and less sustainable in the face of hard reality. Instead as suggested above, we now need to replace this development theory, as well as micro-supply and macro-demand side economic theories, by another one. We need a more rounded, dynamic and all-encompassing supply and demand side economics to analyze, if not to guide, world economic and technological development.

 Real world system evolution has never been guided by or responsive to any global and also not to much local "development" thinking or policy. However, each temporarily leading people probably considered itself as the "developed" civilization and regarded others as "barbarians." Global evolution (or "as is" development) has taken place for a long time. However, it has never been uniform and has always centered in one or a few places. These places and peoples temporarily enjoyed privileged cultural, social, economic, technological, military, and political positions relative to other "dependent" ones. That is, general and especially uniform global development was and remains impossible. The reason is that Gorbachev's (and Higgins') conditions were and remain unfulfilled and unfulfillable. Lower order national / regional / sectoral / group / individual development policy can only marginally affect but not transform the stage of global evolution. Moreover, it can only take place within the possibilities and constraints of that global evolutionary process, which it only helps to shape.

 Therefore, any development "policy" for a particular country, region, sector, group or individual must identify and promote some selected "comparative" advantage within the world economy.

 The "policy" is to find one or more niches in which to carve out a temporary position of "comparative" monopoly advantage in the international division of labor. Then, it may be possible to derive some temporary monopoly rent from the same. Some specialization is necessary, because advantageous and even loss avoiding presence on all industrial and technological fronts is impossible today. Of course, it is advantageous to do so in a newly leading industry or sector,  which is itself able to command temporary monopoly rents. However, each such sector, and even more so each such region or group operating within it, must count on soon losing this advantage again. For soon they will be displaced by competition from others on the world market. The element of classical "comparative advantage" in this strategy might be named after the snowmobile. Some Canadians developed the technologically new snowmobile in response to regional snowy conditions, resources and market possibilities. However, then they used the same locally developed snowmobile to carve out a temporary niche on the world market for themselves.

 On the other hand, what Gorbachev observes correctly is that any discreet national or other sub-global development is now even more impossible than before. No independent national state development is possible at all. This fact of life contradicts all postwar development thinking and policy. Moreover, Gorbachev also points out that a "development" policy of de-linking is now unrealistic. I now also believe that such de-linking is impossible. That is contrary to my own previous view and to one still held by Samir Amin (1986).


...And Toward Marginalizing Dualism ?

 What is a realistic prospect, however, is the growing threat to countries, regions and peoples to be marginalized. That is, they may be involuntarily de-linked from the world process of evolution or development. However, they are then de-linked on terms, which are not of their own choosing. The most obvious case in point is much of sub-Saharan Africa. There is a decreasing world market in the international division of labor for Africa's natural and human resources. Having been squeezed dry like a lemon in the course of world capitalist "development," much of Africa may now be abandoned to its fate. However, the same fate increasingly also threatens other regions and peoples elsewhere. Moreover, they may be found everywhere: In the South (eg. Bangladesh, the Brazilian Northeast, Central America, etc.); in the ex-industrial rustbelt, the South Bronx, and other regions and peoples in the West; and in whole interior regions and peoples in the "socialist" East, eg. on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border. Events in 1989-90 after these lines were written must accelarate and aggravate the marginalization of millions of people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Many regions there are more likely to be Latinamericanized, and some even Africanized and Lebanonized, instead of achieving the West Europanization to which they aspire (Frank 1990 c,d).

 People in all these and other places may now be sacrificed on the altar of growth pole "development" policy. They fall victim to efficient competitive participation in the international division of labor in the world capitalist market and to contemporary social evolution. However, the West may well receive much more migration by the few who can, among the many who wish, to escape this marginal existence in Central America and Africa. North America and Western but soon maybe also Eastern Europe and Japan will be the magnets. Many people prefer to survive exploited by the division of labor in the North than to suffer death by war and starvation or marginalized life without hope in the South.

 In other words, a dual economy and society may now indeed be in the process of formation at this stage of social evolution in the world system. However, this new dualism is different from the old dualism I rejected. The similarity between the two "dualisms" is only apparent.  According to the old dualism, sectors or regions were supposedly separate. That is, they supposedly existed without past or present exploitation between them before "modernization" would join them happily ever after. Moreover, this separate dual existence was seen within countries. I correctly denied all these propositions. In the new dualism, the separation comes afterthe contact and often after exploitation. The lemon is discarded after squeezing it dry. Thus, this new dualism is theresult of the process of social and technological evolution, which others call "development." Moreover, this new dualism is between those who do and those who cannot participate in a world wide division of labor. To some extent, the ins and outs of this world division of labor are in part technologically determined. Thus, this new dualism may partake of Higgins' old technological dualism. Perhaps, I should never have lumped his technological dualism in with the old socio-economic kind.

 To summarize crudely, lower order (country and regional) development  can only carve out a privileged niche at the expense of others within the process of social (including technological) evolution. This niche is usually based on temporary monopoly power. The whole process may be a positive sum game. However, the threats of nuclear war and environmental degradation render this possibility increasingly doubtful. Yet even in a positive sum game, most development for one group still comes at the expense of anti-development for others. They are condemned to dualistic marginalization and/or to underdevelopment of development. That is what real world development really means. Therefore, Higgins' normative definition of development as it ought to be by raising all human welfare turns out to be hardly operational. I myself seem to have come full circle from prioritizing determinant economic, to social, to political back to the determinant economic factors in development. However, now I see them in world economic development. Marta finds that economic problems cannot be solved by economic means. She thinks that the mistake has been to try  that route. Solutions to economic problems must be sought in other ways.


Toward Democracy

 All these developments have also elevated another consideration to the top of the agenda: democracy and especially participatory democracy. Of course, the word "democracy" had been a fellow traveler along these roads all along. But the likes of Rostow Pye, Pool, and Huntington wrote and acted to impose "democracy" under the military boot. Even the Quaker Benoit claimed to have statistically demonstrated that more military = more development. Political modernizers like Apter, Almond and Coleman condoned Third World right wing authoritarian regimes in the name of political "democracy" and economic "development."  The longstanding practice  was to defend right wing authoritarianism as a necessary instrumental defense against left wing totalitarianism in the name of "democratic freedom." This was so long before the US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick popularized this subtle distinction on the right. On the left, the political line was "economic democracy" in the country and "democratic centralism" in the party. The total lack of democracy today (and for all too many yesteryears before) was defended as instrumentally necessary to assure more democracy and development tomorrow. In the name of a top down "mass line," mea culpa, mea maxima culpa I sometimes also fell victim to this short shrift for democracy on the left. At least, I closed a blind eye to it. Today, development must include more democracy. (More) democracy must include (more) respect for human rights. These rights must include (more) political freedom of speech, organization and choice. However, these human rights must also include access to the economic and social basic human needs necessary to exercise such political choice.

 The political crisis of military and authoritarian rule in the Third World and the crisis of socialism (and Marxism) in the East increasingly opened peoples eyes. Even social "scientific" development thinkers followed. Military rule in Latin America and incessant coups d'etat in Africa popularized the study of the state. People sought some other way to run it. The conversion of some socialist dreams into nightmares gave interest in democracy a new lease on life to people in the socialist countries themselves and to those outside who were sympathetic to them. Among socialists in the West, it became obvious (why so late?) that any socialist progress and any progress of socialism  would have to safeguard and improve upon the advances and benefits of "bourgeois" democracy. That would be an absolute minimum socialist demand, and "socialism" could not negate these rights as heretofore. So we can sum up the matter from a worm's eye view. If the economic crisis precludes present and foreseeable progress in economic development or welfare, we the people at least demand the political possibility democratically to express our gripes about it. We the people demand at least the possibility to pursue  any alternatives we can find or forge ourselves -- in participatory democracy through our own popular social movements and with a minimum respect for everybody's human rights.

 For by now it is sadly clear that none of the now available "models" of development are adequate for the present, let alone for the future. This inadequacy is true of all these models, however they may (seem to) differ among each other. This inadequacy characterizes the magic of the world and domestic market, Western top down political democracy, Eastern top down economic democracy, and recent attempts at self-reliant national state de-linking. However hopes are illusiory for a capitalist new international economic order, or for the non-existent and ever less available alternative socialist division of labor / international economic order. Nor does any thing else on the horizon offer most of the population in much of this Third World any chance or hope for equity or efficiency in economic development. This is true at least as long as we, and especially they, define development in any of the orthodox more-of-the-same ways. However it is unfortunately equally true also of the heterodox more-or-less-the-same ways so far reviewed above. As a result by the 1980s for instance, the grand old men Gunnar Myrdal and Raul Prebisch significantly radicalized their views and public statements shortly before they died. (I had criticized them both as excessively conservative reformists in the 1960s).  So what and where are the real alternatives and the more participatory democratic ways to forge and pursue them?


...and Alternative Self-Development

 Armed with these alternative as is and as ought definitions and goals of development, we can now pursue some other development alternatives -- or Another Development, as the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation called it.  First, like these disadvantaged peoples themselves, we can do battle with anti-development or underdevelopment of development as it affects all sorts of "minority" peoples. However, on further inspection these disadvantaged minorities turn out to be in the majority. Minorities would not demand and merit their own and others' special attention qua minorities, if they did not suffer from discrimination and worse at the hands of "the majority." Ethnic, national, linguistic, racial, social, sectoral, age, vocational and other minorities are all subject to the inequity and inefficiency of economic development. Adding them all up, they surely constitute a numerical majority both globally and nationally.

 The biggest "minority," (which admittedly overlaps with these others) is women. They assuredly constitute a statistical majority of the world's and probably all countries' population. Moreover, it has belatedly been statistically confirmed (as women knew all along in their bones if not in their minds) that women do most of the work in the world. They do all the unpaid and much of the low paid reproductive work. They also do much of the productive work: Women do most of the agricultural work in Africa and in many other parts of the world, including the socialist countries. Women also do much low paid industrial and service work everywhere. Adding in the other minorities, probably almost all of the work, and especially the hard part of it, is done by "minorities."

 Then, what is the "majority," and what does it do? It is the elite that has and uses power -- also to define and promote (its own) "development." For, the majority of these "minority" people do not benefit from (equity and efficiency in) economic development. Since "development" is largely the result of work by and for (the welfare of) the majority, it should see this benefit. Since they do not, there must be something wrong , both in the real world and in our "majority" thinking about it!

 Some thinking and praxis has changed, but not much. Marx (!) wanted greater incorporation of women in the labor force as a vehicle of their liberation, but he also expressed fears about the resultant damage to the family. Stalin (!) was perhaps the greatest proponent of womens lib and did the most to incorporate women in the labor force. However, he may have wanted to further Soviet economic "development" more than to liberate women. Their work in the Soviet Union is still unquestioned, but their liberation less so. Their welfare benefit from "development" is certainly questionable. Women also entered the productive labor force elsewhere to replace men. For many went to war or migrated to spur production in other regions or countries. Or women simply entered for other practical reasons. Even so, much female work has failed to  register in social norms or cultural thinking. Despite the above noted work of women in agriculture, land "to those who work it" reforms or technical extension and credit to "agricultural producers" have nowhere been directed at women instead of men! (Why did neither I nor the land reformers "see" this in Chile, when the ownership in land was distributed to men even where and when it was worked by women in female headed households?)  Nor have women in the informal sector in Africa, Asia, and Latin America fared much better when it comes to credit or institutional support. The (still small) recent redirection of development policy and extension work towards women in the Third World must be ascribed to the force of the (re)new(ed) world wide womens (lib?) movement and to its influence on perceptions and equity.

 Academia in the West also discovered women and affirmative action towards them. "Home economics" was transformed and vastly expanded into "womens studies." Courses or even entire programs taught by women mushroomed on "womens history,"  "women in society," "women and politics," etc. So "women and development" also had to follow. Of course, nobody ever said "men's history and development," etc. even if, like Moliere's famous character, they were speaking male prose about men's history and male society and development. Nor does women's lib in the North automatically change womens views of their sisters in the South. At a womens history conference in Amsterdam, Third World women were excluded and told they had no history. So they protested with signs reading "history, herstory, and the real story." However, just putting some (mostly upper/middle class white) women back into the picture, as in a slide show I saw about womens history in Peru, only inverts the matter. It only studies the history (or development) of women instead of or in addition to that of men.

 Nor does looking at women and development necessarily tell the real development story. Marta got an MA in "Women and Development" and learned nothing new about development but much about women and anti-development. The place of women and men in the patriarchal gender structure of society has not penetrated "development theory" and cannot be told simply by relating the story of one or/and the other.  The real story to be (re)told is of the structure and development of society itself.

 The personal is (also) political, as the feminist  refrain has it. That is, the meaning of relational terms are transformed. Therefore also, women and development cannot be only more-of-the-same-old women's development of women instead of or in addition to men. Man made development must be transformed to encompass progressive change in the whole gender structure of society itself. In a word, we must re-conceptualize and re-define development itself to refer to such social transformation of societal relations (and perceptions). Therefore it is only a small step in the right direction to change the emphasis from social factors in or for economic development to social and economic development, especially  for women and their children.

 Some additional feeble steps were taken, or perhaps more accurately recorded, at the UN sponsored world womens congresses in Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980 and Nairobi in 1985. They sought to advance women by their own efforts from their back stage work to at least visible stage performance, if not yet to center stage. However, the present  stage or moment of social evolution (if we may not say of world development) generates the feminization of poverty. Therefore, in our topsy turvy  real world wonderland, these women are only taking modest steps on a gigantic treadmill. But it is moving in the opposite direction under their very feet. Like the Red Queen in Alice's wonderland, they would have to run a lot faster just to stay in the same place.

 Therefore, the issue in this development is not only for women but for everybody to stop or reverse the treadmill. We would have to rewrite the whole gender play and reconstruct the social stage altogether. That would be development! It would be at once more equitable and more efficient, if we still wished to use these terms. Then  we could not call Switzerland and Japan developed societies , no matter how financially or technologically "developed" their economies are. For until recently women could not even vote in Switzerland; and in Japan, women are still treated like geishas not only in mens clubs but also in many of their homes, offices, factories, and fields.

 Many other "minorities" also suffer from anti-development. For instance, many racial, ethnic, national, religious and other minorities are also on real world wonderland treadmills. The real economic losses they suffer often more than counteract the sometime legal and other steps taken by themselves or on their behalf. Pro forma or even de jure recognition of discrimination against these "minorities" hardly counteracts, much less undoes, the de facto plights they suffer. As a result people resort to many self-empowering slogans and movements to at least enhance their own culture and dignity: small-is-beautiful, black-is-beautiful, (this) indigenous-is-noble, (our) nation-is-glorious, (true) religion-is-blessed, (our) community-is-ours, and other defensive (and sometimes, in more senses than one, offensive) slogans and movements. They may be an important element of and contribution to cultural reassertion and self-development, or of ethno-development as Rodolfo Stavenhagen (of earlier Seven Theses fame) now calls it. They maybe even increase the number and velocity of steps on the treadmill. However,  they do not necessarily stop or reverse the treadmill or significantly affect the evolutionary process itself.

 Other costs of anti-development and underdevelopment of development even subtract from the welfare of the vast majority. Hoverer, they may be combatted only by real numerical minority social movements. Ever developing threats to peace and the environment are cases in point. The Scandinavian headed Palme Commission and Brundtland Report and the United Nations special session on Development and Disarmament have drawn world wide attention to and sought to mobilize action on these problems and their connections. Although strong peace movements are more visible in the North, the problem of hot war is, of course, particularly important in  and for the South. During the past four decades of accelerated Third World "development," every war in the World has taken place in the South, and every year there have been several wars going on there simultaneously. Any break out of peace in the South, such as in 1988, is therefore a real (contribution to) development. Growing peace and human rights movements in the South itself, with notable womens leadership and participation, are now making increasing contributions to this development.

 Similarly, although environmental degradation may be more (locally) visible in the North (including the East), the globally most serious environmental anti-development is now probably taking place in the South. Important instances are the deforestation of Amazonia, Indonesia, the Himalayan slopes, etc. and the desertification in Africa and Asia. Therefore all around the globe, regional, local, peasant, native, tribal and other environmental movements are mobilizing to protect their own sources of livelihood. However, thereby they are also protecting ecological survival for all of us through another and a sustainable eco-development (Redclift 1987).

 To end on a positive upbeat note,  I applaud and participate in these social movements of participatory civil democracy. They do all they can to mobilize their participants for real - that is self - development for themselves and often also for others in their respective spheres of influence (Rahman 1989). Indeed, they express and exercise their participants freedom of choice for their own variety within the unity of our one world. I have also written about these movements and their  development of civil democracy in the West, East, and South. This time I wrote with Marta in Fuentes and Frank (1989) and Frank and Fuentes (1990).

 
Our "Ten Theses on Social Movements" are:

 1. The "new" social movements are not new, even if they have some new features; and the "classical" ones are relatively new and perhaps temporary.

 2. Social movements display much variety and changeability, but have in common individual mobilization through a sense of morality and (in)justice and social power through social mobilization against deprivation and for survival and identity.

 3. The strength and importance of social movements is  cyclical and related to long political economic and (perhaps associated) ideological cycles. When the conditions that give rise to the movements change (through the action of the movements themselves and/or more usually due to changing circumstances), the movements tend to disappear.

 4. It is important to distinguish  the class composition of social movements, which are mostly middle class in the West, popular/working class in the South, and some of each in the East.

 5. There are many different kinds of social movements. The majority seek more autonomy rather than state power; and the latter tend to negate themselves as social movements.

 6. Although most social movements are more defensive than offensive and tend to be temporary, they are important (today and tomorrow perhaps the most important) agents of social transformation.

 7. In particular, social movements appear as the agents and reinterpreters of "delinking" from contemporary capitalism and "transition to socialism".

 8. Some social movements are likely to overlap in membership or be more compatible and permit coalition with others; and some are likely to conflict and compete with others. It may be useful to inquire into these relations.

 9. However, since social movements, like street theater, write their own scripts - if any - as they go along, any prescription of agendas or strategies, let alone tactics, by outsiders - not to mention intellectuals - is likely to be irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.

 10. In conclusion, social movements now serve to extend, deepen and even redefine democracy from traditional state political and economic democracy to civil democracy in civil society (Fuentes and Frank: 1989:179).

 Therefore, popular social movements, especially with the more active participation and leadership of women, can also be the initiators, instruments, and beneficiaries of another more democratic development.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 In the preparation of this autobiographical survey, I am indebted to each of the friends I name therein. However, my greatest debt is to the members of my family, who have shared and  suffered - often more than I - these experiences with me. Moreover, each of them, Miguel, Paulo and Marta has also done some work on this essay itself. Especially Marta's input has been much greater than either of us acknowledge. She chose to witdraw her name from the joint authorship of the early drafts. So I had to eliminate several references to her, and I changed most everything from "we" to "I."

FRANK, A. G. REFERENCES CITED

1955a. "The Economic Development of Nicaragua"
Inter American Economic Affairs VIII, 4, Spring
1955b. "Policy Decisions and the Economic Development of Ceylon" Economia Internazionale VIII, 4, November
1958. "General Productivity in Soviet Agriculture and Industry: The Ukraine 1928-53" Journal of Political Economy 66 December
1958-59. "Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting Standards: An Approach to the Study of Organization" Human Organization XVII, 1, Winter
1963. "Administrative Role Definition and Social Change" Human Organization XXII, 1, Winter
1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America.
New York: Monthly Review Press
1969. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution.
New York: Monthly Review Press
1972. Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment. New York, Monthly: Review Press
1975. On Capitalist Underdevelopment. Bombay: Oxford University Press
1976. Economic Genocide in Chile. Equilibrium on the Point of a Bayonet. Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books
1977. "Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor" Review I, 1, Summer
1978a. World Accumulation 1492-1789, New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press
1978b. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment.
New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press
1979. Mexican Agriculture 1521-1630. Transformation of the Mode of Production. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1980. Crisis: In the World Economy. New York: Holmes & Meier and London: Heinemann
1981a. Crisis: In the Third World. New York: Holmes & Meier and London: Heinemann
1981b. Reflections on the Economic Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Hutchinson
1982. Dynamics of Global Crisis (with S. Amin, G. Arrighi & I. Wallerstein). New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press
1983 & 4. The European Challenge. Nottingham: England, Spokesman Press and Westbury Conn.,USA: Lawrence Hill Publishers
1984. Critique and Anti-Critique. New York:Praeger Publishers and London: Macmillan Press
1986. "Is the Reagan Recovery Real or the Calm Before the Storm?"
Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) Vol. XXI, Nos. 21 & 22, May 24 & 31.
1987. "Debt Where Credit is Due" Journal fur Entwicklungspolitik III, No. 3.
1988a. El Desafio de la Crisis. Madrid: IEPALA Editorial and Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad
1988b. "The Socialist Countries in the World Economy: The East-South Dimension" in Lelio Basso Foundation, Ed., Theory and Practice of Liberation at the End of the XXth Century. Bruxelles: Bruylant
1988c. "American Roulette in the Globonomic Casino: Retrospect and Prospect on the World Economic Crisis Today" in Research in Political Economy, Paul Zarembka, Ed. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 3-43.
1989.  "The Socialist Countries in the World Economy:
The East-South Dimension" in The Soviet Bloc and the Third World:The Political Economy of East-South Relations, B.H. Schulz and W.H. Hansen, Eds.Boulder, Westview Press 1989 (pp. 9-26).
1990a. "A Theoretical Introduction to Five Thousand Years of World System History." Review June 1990.
1990b. "De Quelles Transitions et de Quels Modes de Production s'agit-il dans le Systeme-Monde Reel? Commentaire sur l'Article de Wallerstein" Sociologie et Societés Vol. XXII, No.2,October 1990.
1990c. "No End to History! History to No End?"
Social Justice, San Francisco, Vol.17, No. 4, Dec. 1990
European Labour Forum, Nottingham, No. 2, Autumn 1990.
1990d. "East European Revolution of 1989. Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (and Socialists?).
in The Future of Socialism: Perspectives from the Left. William K. Tabb, Ed. New York: Monthly Review Press 1990, pp. 87-105. Also in Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) XXV, 4, February 3, 1990, pp. 251-258, and Third World Quarterly (London) XII, 2, April, 1990, pp. 36-52.
1991. World System History, Please
Journal of World History Vol.II,No.1, Jan. 1991.
Frank, A.G. and Fuentes, M. 1990. "Social Movments in World History"in S.Amin, G. Arrighi, A.G. Frank & I. Wallerstein
Transforming the Revolution. Social Movements and the World-System. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Fuentes, M. and Frank, A.G. 1989. "Ten Theses on Social Movements" World Development XVII, 2, February
Gills, Barry K. and A.G. Frank 1990. "The Cumulation of Accumulation: Theses and Research Agenda for 5000 years of World System History." Dialectical Anthropology Vol. 12, No. 2. Summer 1990. Also in Precapitalist Core-Periphery Relations, C. Chase-Dunn & T. Hall, Eds. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.



OTHER REFERENCES CITED

 Adelman, I. and  Morris, C.T. 1973. Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. Stanford: Stanford University Press
Amin, S. 1974. Accumulation on a World Scale, New York: Monthly Review Press
------1986. La Deconnexion. Pour Sortir du Ssteme Mondiale. Paris: La Decouverte
Arndt, H.W. 1987.  Economic Development. The History of an Idea.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press
Asad, T. 1975. Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter. London: Ithaca Press
Bergesen, Albert 19xx. "
UNESCO International Social Science Journal
Blomstrom, M. and B. Hettne 1984.  Development Theory in Transition. The Dependency Debate & Beyond. London: Zed
Borah, W. 1951. "New Spain's Century of Depression" Ibero-Americana XXXV
Cardoso, F.H. 1977. "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States" Latin American Research Review XII, 3
Cardoso, F.H & E. Faletto 1979. Development and Dependence in Latin America., Berkely: University of California Press
Chevalier, F. 1970 (1952,1956). Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda. Berkeley: University of California Press
Evans, P. 1979.  Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinationals, State and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Foster-Carter, A. 1976. "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment" World Development IV, 3, March
Frobel, F., J. Heinrichs & O. Kreye (1980) The New International Division of Labour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Geneovese, E.D. 1968. In Red and Black. New York: Random House Pantheon Books
Geertz, C. 1966. Agricultural Involution. The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press
Gonzalez Casanova, P. 1965.  La Democracia en Mexico. Mexico: Era
Gorbachev, M. 1988. "Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly" Moscow News Supplement ot No. 51 (3351)
Gough, K. 1968. "New Proposals for Anthropologists" Current Anthropology, May, revised as "Anthropology: Child of Imperialism" Monthly Review ....
Hagen, E.E. 1962. On the Theory of Social Change. Economic Growth Begins. Homewood: Irvin Press.
Hettne, Bjorn 1990. Development Theory and the Three Worlds.
London: Longman.
Higgins, B. 1977. "Economic Development and Cultural Change: Seamless Web or Patchwork Quilt?" in M. Nash, Ed. Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz. Economic Development and Cultural Change XXV,Supplement
------ 1991. "Equity and Efficiency in Economic Development" in
in Equity and Efficiency in Economic Development:
Essays in Honor of Benjamin Higgins. Donald J. Savoie, Ed.
Montreal:McGill Queens University Press, forthcoming
Hirschman, A.O. 1982. "The Rise and Decline of Development Economics" in A.O, Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Huizer, G. 1972. The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath Lexington Books
Hunt, Diana 1989. Economic Theories of Development. An Analysis of Competing Paradigms. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Jonas-Bodenheimer, S. 1971. "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment" in K.T.Fann and D.C. Hodges, Eds. Readings in US Imperialism. Boston:Porter Sargent
Kay, Cristóbal 1989. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. London: Routledge.
Larrain, Jorge 1989. Theories of Development. London: Polity Press.
League of Nations 1942. The Network of World Trade. Geneva: League of Nations
-------- 1945. Industrialization and Foreign Trade. Geneva: League of Nations
Leal, J.F. and M. Huacuja R. 1982.Economia y sistema de haciendas      en Mexico. Mexico: Era
Lerner, D. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Glencoe: The Free Press
Lind, Christopher 1983. "Ethics, Economics and Canada's Catholic Bishops"  Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall
Little, I.M.D. 1982. Economic Development.Theory, Policy, and International Relations. New York: Basic Books
Livingston, I. 1981  "The Development of Development Economics"   ODI Review Vol. 2
McClelland, D. 1961. The Achieving Society. Princeton: Van Nostrand
Meier, G.M. and Seers, D., Eds. 1981. Pioneers in Development. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
Millikan, M. and Rostow, W.W. 1957. A Proposal. Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press
Pasinetti, L.L. 1981.  Structural Change and Economic Growth.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ranis, G. and Schultz, T.P. ,Eds. 1988. The State of Economic Development. Progress and Perspectives. New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Redclift, M. 1987. Sustainable Development. Exploring the Contradictions. London and New York: Methuen
Rostow, W.W. 1952. The Process of Economic Growth. New York: Norton
------ 1962. The Stages of Economic Growth.A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Schank, Gregory 1982. "The World Economic Crisis According to Andre Gunder Frank" Contemporary Marxism, San Francisco, No. 5, Summer
Schumpeter, J. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press
-----1939. Business Cycles. 2 vols.  New York: McGraw Hill
-----1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers
Senghaas, D. 1985. The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory. Dover, New Hampshire: Berg Publishers.
Strassman, P. 197x. "The Chicago School of Economics" Journal of Social Issues ???
Toye, J. 1987. Dilemmas of Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Turner, J.H. et al 1972. Studies in Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman
United Nations 1951. Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. New York: United Nations
U.N. Development Forum 1988. July-August
Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press
White, B. 1983. "Agricultural Involution and its Critics: Twenty Years After" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars XV, 2, April-June.
Wolf, Eric 1982. Europe and the People Without History. Berkely: University of California Press.

End of Part 4